I. INTRODUCTION
The decline of the business method exception to patentability will increase the frequency of patent floods. By patent flood, I mean a dramatic jump in the number of patents filed covering a specific class of inventions, as we now observe in e-commerce. 3 Floods are likely to become more frequent as future entrepreneurs respond to the appearance of a new market with a spate of business method patent applications claiming new methods tailored to the new market.
A flood of related patents in a new market creates special problems for competition in addition to the usual problems that arise we will often see a flood of business method patents. 5 In Part IV, I describe the problems that follow from a patent flood: low quality patents, increased litigation, exclusionary conduct, and delay of cumulative innovation. In Part V, I address the history of patent pools and cross-licensing agreements that emerged in response to previous patent floods as well as the benefits of pools compared to the risk that pools may facilitate cartelization or other antitrust problems. Finally, in Part VI, I discuss the patentable subject matter requirement 6 and the nonboviousness standard 7 in determining the validity of business method patents and regulating future patent floods.
II. BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS

A. The Business Method Exception
Section 101 of the Patent Act specifies that patentable subject matter includes "any new or useful process, . . . or any new and useful improvement thereof . . . ."
8 Despite such broad language, 9 some processes have never been considered patentable subject matter. For example, purely mental processes are not patentable. 10 Additionally, the steps of a square dance or the process of calling the dance are not patentable. 11 Until recently, the business method exception precluded patents on most business-related processes. These classifications may stem from the failure of the courts to clearly state comprehensive principle for dividing patentable from unpatentable processes. One approach limits patents to industrial processes, 13 while another approach limits patents to processes that manipulate artifacts or cause physical effects.
14 A new standard, announced in State Street 15 and AT&T v. Excel, 16 expands patentable subject matter to include processes that produce a "useful, concrete and tangible result." 17 While the business method exception was compatible with the earlier and more narrow definitions of patentability, the new, expansive definition vitiates the exception.
In State Street, State Street Bank sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity against Signature Financial's patent for software used to administer a type of mutual fund. 18 The patent claims described a computerized accounting system that calculated daily share values. The district court ruled in favor of State Street Bank, invalidating the invention, 19 under the business method exception and the Automated financial/management business data processing method patents cannot trace their origins back to the founding of our nation. However, contrary to popular view, they did not suddenly spring into being in the late 1990s. On January 8, 1889, the era of automated financial/management business data processing method patents was born. United States patents 395,781; 395,782; and 395,783 were granted to inventor-entrepreneur Herman Hollerith on that date . . . . Mr. Hollerith's method and apparatus patents automated the tabulating and compiling of statistical information for businesses and enterprises. They were acclaimed nationally and viewed as revolutionizing business data processing. The protection of his patents allowed his fledgling Tabulating Machine Company to succeed and thrive. In 1924, Thomas J. Watson, Sr. changed the company name to International Business Machine Corporation. Hollerith manual punch cards (IBM punch cards) and his methods for processing business data were still being used up until the birth of the personal computer era.
Id.
13. See John R. Thomas mathematical algorithm exception. 20 On appellate renew, Judge Rich denounced the business method exception as unworkable in the PTO 21 and not firmly grounded in any case law. 22 Judge Rich was slightly more deferential toward the mathematical algorithm exception, which originated in Gottschalk v. Benson. 23 In that case, the Supreme Court denied patent protection for computer software designed to convert one type of number into another type of number. The State Street district court believed Signature's invention was governed squarely by Benson. 24 Judge Rich disagreed; he argued that unlike software in Benson, Signature's invention achieved a useful, concrete, and tangible result, so the mathematical algorithm exception did not apply. 25 Essentially, Benson was distinguishable because Signature's method manipulated numbers representing share value.
The State Street decision set off a flood of e-commerce patents. The typical e-commerce patent has two distinguishing attributes: "(1) it describes an essentially commercial (as opposed to technological) activity, typically some way to make or save money; and (2) the hardware and software elements are described and claimed at such a high level of generality that they are for all practical purposes nominal." 26 
B. Taxonomy of Business Methods Patents
The following taxonomy classifies business methods in terms of their effect on market behavior. Business-related inventions can be claimed as both products and processes, 32 and the business method exception is applied to both. The invention in State Street was claimed as a business system (i.e., machine), rather than a process, because the law once favored software claimed as part of a system over software claimed as part of a process. 33 Sensibly, the business method exception extended to such a system claims to avoid evasion of the rule. Courts could construe State Street narrowly to eliminate the business method exception only for business system patents, but the language in the case indicated that Judge Rich wanted to dispose of the exception entirely. ATT v. Excel followed soon after State Street and left no doubt on this matter. An AT&T invention claimed as a process involving pricing of long distance phone service was judged to be patentable subject matter.
34
Instead of focusing on claim format, I will focus on whether a business method patent protects a true process innovation or a product-related innovation. To capture the distinction between process innovations and product-related innovations, I will introduce the terms administrative method and customer service method to classify business methods. Administrative methods are back-office methods that increase productivity or reduce organizational or production costs in a firm. 35 Customer service methods yield services that are consumed by customers or methods related to pricing, advertising, or other marketing concerns. I base this distinction on the function of the innovation in the market. Some business methods are consumable services and others are processes that contribute to business productivity.
There are two reasons to classify some business methods as product-related innovations. First, the economic definition of product encompasses goods and services. A service, like a massage, is consumed by an end user, and a patent on a new method of massaging protects a new product variety. Second, some method patents give de facto protection to a product variety as well as a process. A broad patent that protects the only method (or only practical method) of implementing a financial security extends de facto protection to the financial security.
36
Customer service method inventors may create either new product varieties or new product features. 37 Many business method patents 35 . See, e.g., Louis Uchitelle, Business To Business: It's Just the Beginning, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2000, at H1 (discussing the increased productivity available through the Internet).
A decade ago, before the Internet, Wal-Mart connected the cash registers in its stores to its thousands of suppliers so that a shirt sold in Omaha registered with the company that made it in South Carolina. That pioneering system, however, required a huge investment in special computers and dedicated phone lines. Few other companies matched Wal-Mart's achievement, and in 1998 Wal-Mart itself switched its network entirely to the less expensive, more flexible Internet.
Id.
36. Economists speak of drastic and non-drastic process innovations. A drastic process innovation reduces the marginal cost of producing a product by a magnitude so large that no firm using a pre-existing process can compete with the innovator even if the innovator charges a monopoly price. Any process innovation of a lesser magnitude is called non-drastic. A patented drastic process yields de facto exclusive rights to the product produced using the process. The present invention provides a method and system for single-action ordering of items in a client/server environment. The single-action ordering system of the present invention reduces the number of purchaser interactions needed to place an order and reduces the amount of sensitive information that is transmitted between a client system and a server system.
See also Theresa Riordan, Patents Considered Vital to Thrive on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1999, at C39 (reporting that Amazon.com holds a patent on a system that enables repeat online customers to avoid re-entering data when placing an order). 51. See U.S. Patent No. 5,797,127 (issued Aug. 18, 1998); Merges, supra note 26, at 579-80 n.5 (describing a patent that "covers 'airline ticket options,' i.e., the purchase and sale of the right to buy tickets at a later time for a specified price").
52. Administrative method patents reach all sorts of management techniques. There are financial method patents relating to the analysis and presentation of financial data. 56 There are patents on inventory and distribution management methods. 57 There is a patent on a payment system. 58 Various Internet-based manufacturing consulting inventions are probably patentable. 59 There are even patented lawrelated administrative methods.
60
Patenting customer service methods is more problematic than patenting administrative methods. Since customer service methods are closely connected to a particular market, the opening of a new market will induce a flood of customer service method inventions and patents. Administrative method inventions are less tied to a particular market and should not create the same risk of floods. Interestingly, proponents of business method patents tend to point to administrative method inventions to make their case, and opponents point to customer service methods. The recent PTO White Paper emphasizes that business method inventions in Class 705, automated data processing methods, follow a long tradition of invention in the field of data processing machinery like the IBM tabulator machine. , at H29 (describing three innovations at General Electric that are patentable subject matter after State Street). GE developed a Web site where its engineers in 100 countries can share ideas and work on projects simultaneously. Id. Next, G.E. created "'wizards' that enable customers to solve complex problems on the Web. A design engineer at a manufacturing company, for example, can log on to the G.E. plastics site and use a specialized engineering calculator to determine a polycarbonate's strength, adhesion and color." Id. Finally, the G.E. aircraft-engines business implemented imaging methods through a Web site in a way that cuts the cost of engine repairs. In the past, a G.E. representative would visit a customer and inspect engine parts to decide whether they could be retained or rebuilt, or discarded for a new part. Now, much of that work can be done cheaply and quickly over the Internet with images transmitted from the customer to G.E. Id.
60. See supra note 30; see also Riordan, supra note 50, at C39 (describing a patent on a method of allocating assets in a divorce settlement); U.S. Patent No. 6,246,991 (issued June 12, 2001) (patenting software for implementing multimedia wills).
61. See generally USPTO White Paper, supra note 12. Business machines play a role in a firm comparable to an administrative method. For example, the photocopier is a durable the other hand, opponents point to the patents on securities and ask whether there was adequate incentive for financial innovation without patents.
III. PATENT FLOODS
A patent flood occurs when many inventors apply for patents on similar inventions during an interval of a few years. 63 A recent example is the flood of gene patents. 64 The development of efficient gene sequencing technology and the Human Genome Project provided the impetus for a flood of gene discoveries and patents. 65 Earlier patent floods occurred in the motion picture, airplane, and petroleum-refining industries. The motion picture and airplane patent floods followed the efforts of Edison and the Wright brothers demonstrating technical feasibility of the motion picture and the airplane. The flood of petroleum refining patents followed the discovery of the cracking process of refining. The flood of ecommerce and other business method patents 66 is the latest patent flood.
There has been a dramatic rise in the number of business method patents since State Street. 67 In particular, the number of e-commerce business machine that provides a flow of copying service. A substantial portfolio of patents relating to xerography gave Xerox a monopoly in the market for photocopiers. 68 as have the number of financial patents. 69 Two factors jointly caused the flood of e-commerce patents: (1) the introduction of the Internet; and (2) the demise of the business method exception. The introduction of the Internet is a technical breakthrough equivalent to the Wright brothers' flight at Kitty Hawk. The Internet makes e-commerce possible and e-commerce creates new opportunities for invention.
Equally, the expansion of patentable subject matter sanctioned by State Street caused the flood of e-commerce patents since most of the e-commerce inventions would not be patentable subject matter under pre-State Street standards. In contrast, the flood of financial patents is caused strictly by the demise of the business method exception because there has not been a technical breakthrough in the financial services industry.
70
Eliminating the business method exception will increase the frequency of future patent floods. Past patent floods were set off by a technical breakthrough. Such technical breakthroughs will continue to occur to set off patent floods. Any change in patent law that increases the range of patentable subject matter will naturally method patents. Applications rose from 920 in 1997, to 1,300 in 1998, and to 2,600 in 1999. In 1999, the PTO issued 583 business method software patents. Id.
68. See Stern, supra note 66, at 154; see also Riordan, supra note 50. There are about half a dozen firms modeled after Walker Digital, each hoping to become patent factories. Walker Digital received thirty patents including the key Priceline.com patent covering online auctions and also has 300 pending patent applications. Id. 70. Defenders of the State Street decision disagree with my view that the case eliminated the business method exception. Both Judge Rich and Judge Newman, searched the case law and found only weak support in dicta establishing a business method exception. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 297-98 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Judge Rich intended to dispel the misperception that a business method exception existed. He argued that cases supposedly standing for the business method exception could be better explained through application of the rule that abstract principles are unpatentable. Although I think his treatment of the cases is reasonable, Judge Rich evades the longstanding PTO rule against patents on business methods and the consensus among commentators, including himself at an earlier date, that there was a business method exception. For further critical commentary, see the excellent analysis in Thomas, supra note 13. Whether State Street eliminated the business method exception or simply clarified established law, it set off a flood of business method patents. Defenders of State Street admit this result, but blandly assert that State Street made practitioners aware of a class of inventions they previously overlooked. See USPTO White Paper, supra note 12.
increase the frequency of patent floods by bringing a wider range of technology within the ambit of patent protection. Thus, the Chakrabarty decision, which confirmed that living organisms are patentable subject matter, increased the likelihood of biotechnology patent floods by broadening the range of biotechnology that is patentable. State Street has the same of effect by making software implemented business methods patentable.
However, State Street has two other effects that create special concern. First, a technological breakthrough is no longer a precondition for a patent flood. Any factor that opens a new market might set off a future flood of business method patents. New markets often yield various new methods of doing business-all of which can now be patented. Second, future technological breakthroughs might set off two different patent floods: a flood of patents covering the relevant technology and a flood of patents covering business methods in the new market opened by the breakthrough. 71 Fears about future business method patent floods could be allayed by a narrow interpretation of State Street and a rigorous application of the nonobviousness standard. The courts, though, may allow a broad reach of patent law to all sorts of business methods 72 with a modest role for the nonobviousness requirement. A broad reading of State Street allows business method claims that do not mention 71 . Note that even if the technical breakthrough does not set off a flood of technologybased patents, it is possible it will set off a flood of business method-based patents.
72. Several scholars expressed concern about the broad reach of State Street. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 66, at 154 ("Accordingly, a line of subsequent poor decisions based on State Street should be anticipated."); see also Raskind, supra note 12, at 91.
A further source of unease over this opinion is its potential for generating a boom in business method patents. This protection extends to fields other than financial services . . . . Banking, insurance, and accounting are most likely to be immediately involved in seeking such patent protection. However, protection is unlikely to be limited to these sectors. In its place the Federal Circuit required only that a claimed process achieve a useful result, an exceptionally lenient standard that appears to place few limitations on the possibilities for private appropriation. Keenly aware of these holdings, applicants have besieged the Patent Office with applications ranging from financial software to Internet-based business models.
Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship software. 73 Judge Rich apparently acknowledged that the precomputer method, in Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 74 is patentable subject matter. This patent covered a manufacture and process designed to prevent waiters and other restaurant employees from falsifying sales and receipts. Judge Rich explained that the patent was invalidated on obviousness grounds and not because it claimed a business method. After State Street, he would also determine a diaper service to be patentable subject matter. More significantly, basic business method innovations like the distribution system at Sears, 75 the multi-divisional structure of the firm, and the Fed-Ex hub-and-spoke air delivery system are now likely to be patentable subject matter.
IV. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY PATENT FLOODS
Patent floods can exacerbate three social costs attributable to patents: (1) high licensing and litigation costs; (2) exclusionary misuse of patents; and (3) a retarding effect on diffusion and cumulative innovation. 76 Patents deter entry or induce exit of firms competing with a patent owner. Exclusion of competitors is justified when a firm owns a strong and valid patent. However, exclusion can also be achieved with the aid of weak or invalid patents. A large firm 73 The heart of the operation . . . was the scheduling system, which helped assure consistently high stock-turn. A complex, rigidly enforced timetable made it possible to fill a steady stream of orders from a large number of different departments. Each department was given fifteen minutes to send the assembling rooms the items listed on a specific order. If any items failed to appear within that time period, the order was shipped without them. The delayed part of the order was sent by prepaid express as soon as it was ready, and the negligent department was charged both for the extra express cost and for a fine of fifty cents per item. can use the threat of patent litigation to drive smaller firms out of a market. The threat may succeed even if the patent is likely invalid or the defendant is unlikely to be an infringer. The high cost of defending a patent suit can strain the financial resources of a small start-up company. Potential entrants will survey market niches and try to steer clear of niches with many patents so they can reduce the risk of patent litigation.
Although patents certainly promote innovation, they also retard diffusion of technology and cumulative innovation. Patent owners slow diffusion by refusing to license their patents, or more commonly, by charging royalties that discourage efficient use of patented inventions. Patent owners slow cumulative innovation by bargaining for a share of the surplus created by inventors who improve the patented invention or use it in their research.
77 Naturally, the incentive to improve patented inventions is diminished compared to the case in which the improver keeps the entire surplus from the improvement.
Patent floods lead to lower quality patents exacerbating the first two social costs. "Low patent quality" is shorthand for such problems as overlapping claims, inappropriately broad claims, slow patent prosecution, and patents on obvious inventions. 78 The problem of overlapping claims is inherent to patent floods because of the likelihood of near simultaneous invention and multiple patent applications covering the same invention. The other problems arise because of the difficulty the PTO has dealing with patent floods.
79
Time pressure, lack of expertise, and lack of prior art yield low patent quality during floods. 80 The PTO directs patent applications to 77. Improvers are usually infringers and need a license from the patent owner of the basic invention.
78. See Merges, supra note 26, at 590 (discussing the low quality of software and business method patents); see also Lerner, supra note 69, at 24. U. 80. The PTO has instituted a mandatory second review of business method patents to examiners in the field of technology appropriate for the claimed invention. A flood in a particular field means that the average time to complete prosecution rises as resources are stretched. 81 The demand for skilled people in the emerging area of technology makes it difficult to attract and retain examiners in the field. 82 And the technical breakthrough precipitating a flood might take a while to enter the prior art.
83
Low patent quality increases patent licensing and litigation cost. These costs increase because bargaining becomes more difficult and the probability of patent disputes grows as quality deteriorates. Delayed patent prosecution, and numerous and overlapping patents, make it costly for a possible infringer to negotiate a license or even determine with whom to bargain. Overly broad claims inappropriately expand the number of potential infringers and the probability of litigation. Additionally, when numerous inventors 84 own related patents and patent applications, there are apt to be disputes about priority or the scope of similar claims. Gray and Bell settled their differences, with Gray getting a $100,000 settlement and lucrative contract work. But the early days of the telephone were marked by many other patent disputes. At one point the Bell System had 600 pending patent infringement cases. Id.
fail.
86 Thus, there is a large population of start-ups that are vulnerable to exclusionary tactics. Low quality patent examination makes it easy for a dominant firm intent on exclusion to collect a portfolio of patents. 87 Even if the patent flood does not promote socially unwarranted exclusionary tactics, it may have a negative impact on industry evolution. The patent flood raises the cost of entry to the new market, and overly broad or invalid patents may favor inefficient producers who survive the shake-out at the expense of more efficient, but patent-poor firms. 88 These problems are becoming apparent in e-commerce markets that entered the shake-out phase. 89 Commentators predict huge amounts of patent litigation. 90 Weak or invalid business method
See Steven Klepper & Elizabeth Graddy, The Evolution of New Industries and the Determinants of Market Structure, 21 RAND J. ECON. 27, 28-35 (1990) (gathering evidence that
shows that new industries first experience rapid entry, followed by a shake-out phase when many more firms exit than enter, and finally a mature phase with a steady number of firms).
87. Dominant firms can patent their own inventions and purchase patent rights from other firms, especially those exiting the market during a shake-out. See, e.g., Kevin G. patents might be used to deter entry, 91 or induce firms to accept licenses. 92 Moreover, patent suits will shape the structure of the industry by encouraging mergers.
93
Patent floods also exacerbate the costs from slowed diffusion and cumulative innovation. 94 The transaction costs associated with obtaining numerous licenses may retard technical progress. 95 These transaction costs probably rise faster than the number of patents because multilateral bargaining is more difficult than bilateral bargaining. Furthermore, the flood of patents increases the likelihood that different parties will own patents on complementary inventions-i.e., inventions that efficiency dictates should be used America" and predicts "large-scale disruption of U.S. commerce, as sharp operators move to patent business methods and assert patents against the unsuspecting." Robert M. Kunstadt, Opening Pandora's Box, IP MAG., Jan. 1999, at http://www.ipmag.com/monthly/99-jan/kunstadt.html (last visited May 12, 1999).
91. See Shapiro, supra note 63, at 34.
Our current patent system is causing a potentially dangerous situation in several fields, including biotechnology, semiconductors, computer software, and e-commerce in which a would-be entrepreneur or innovator may face a barrage of infringement actions that it must overcome to bring its product or service to market. In other words, we are in danger of crea[t]ing significant transactions costs for those seeking to commercialize new technology based on multiple patents, overlapping rights, and hold-up problems.
Id.; Dreyfuss, supra note 89, at 270 (noting that an entry deterrent effect created by business method patents that are likely to be invalid . The chairman of Amazon.com has acknowledged that business method patents may stifle others from building on patented innovations. "He is calling for the government to limit patents for software and Internet business models to three to five years and to require a period for public comment on patent applications in those areas before they are granted." Id.
95. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 64; Riordan, supra note 85 (quoting historian Amy Friedlender: "'A radio patent pool was finally formed in 1919' . . . . 'One of the reasons it was formed was there were so many patents and so much cross-licensing that development of radio had become almost sclerotic'"); Shulman, supra note 92, at 76 (describing a thicket of patents that created problems for development of automobiles and airplanes in the United States).
together. The owners of complementary patents have an incentive to charge combined license fees even higher than the monopoly license fee. 96 Finally, when a technical breakthrough opens a new market, a flood of business method patents could block commercial exploitation of the underlying technology. The cost of negotiating appropriate business method patent licenses reduces the incentive effect of broad patent protection for a technical pioneer.
V. CAN POOLING AND CROSS-LICENSING SOLVE THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY PATENT FLOODS?
Patent floods usually induce extensive patent licensing managed through patent pools or cross-licensing agreements. 98 A patent license is a contract in which a patent owner grants the licensee permission to practice the patented invention. 99 Cross-licensing describes reciprocal patent licenses that two or more patent owners grant to each other. Pooling is more comprehensive than cross-licensing. Patent pools include many members and gather most or all of the patents in an industry. 100 Typically, a pool issues a blanket license authorizing use of all the patents in the pool. 101 The license revenue is distributed to members in proportion to the value of the patents they contributed to the pool.
102
Pools and cross-licensing mitigate two of the negative effects of patent floods, but sometimes create new problems. They reduce transaction costs and avoid the uncertainty of litigation cost created by a flood of patents. 103 The blanket license eliminates worries about patent litigation based on any of the patents in the pool. Transaction costs are low because monitoring costs are reduced for patent owners and licensees only need to negotiate a single blanket license. For the same reasons, they also cut through a thicket of patents that otherwise could stall production and development in an industry facing a patent flood. 104 On the other hand, pooling and cross-licensing cause a variety of anticompetitive harms.
Antitrust law shows considerable deference to patent licenses.
105
The owner of a broad patent on an important invention is supposed to enjoy significant exclusionary power and monopoly profit regardless of whether the patent is licensed. High profit provides the incentive to seek important inventions. Thus, a cross-license agreement should secure monopoly profits for the owners of a pair of essential, complementary inventions. 106 A similar statement holds for licenses settling priority disputes. A license that allows two inventors to split the monopoly profit from an invention serves social welfare if one of them is surely entitled to the patent. 107 Despite these benefits anticompetitive harms do exist. Pools and cross-licensing can insulate invalid patents from challenge, expand the scope of minor patents, and facilitate collusive pricing.
Pools and cross-licensing pose anticompetitive threats because: it is hard to distinguish settlement of a legitimate priority dispute from a cross-license between the owners of two sham patents; and it is hard to distinguish settlement of a legitimate dispute about scope of 358-59 (1977) 106. More precisely, if the single owner of the pair of complementary patents can command a monopoly profit, then two owners should be allowed to obtain the same profit through cross-licensing.
107. Again, if the patent securely in the hands of one of the inventors generates monopoly profit, then no problem exists with a license that allows two inventors to split the monopoly profit.
claims and infringement from a cross-license between the owners of two minor patents. 108 Many patents issued during a flood cover insignificant inventions and many patents are invalid. Licensing to settle patent litigation might be a socially desirable way to avoid litigation cost, but it also might be part of a collusive strategy.
109
The other anticompetitive threat is a pool or cross-licensing agreement justified as a way to cut through a patent thicket and economize on transaction costs might actually serve merely to orchestrate collusion on prices. A patent license may include terms that would normally violate the antitrust rule against price fixing. For example, a license might specify the sale price, geographic market, or output level of the end product made using a patent. 110 Such terms make it easier to establish and enforce a cartel.
111 If the patents in the pool are substitutes, the effect is similar to firms merging to monopoly.
112 Antitrust law gives us many likely examples of patent pools facilitating collusion. The problem of patent accumulation, the aggregation of several or numerous patents under single ownership or control, is conceptually indistinguishable from the merger problem under antitrust law . . . . A pool of competing patents can be more readily analogized to a loose association than to a horizontal merger. This, of course, depends upon one's evaluation of the pool's efficiency-creating potential. A pool of competing patents is difficult to distinguish from the cartel in this respect.
Id.
113 The risk of price-fixing disguised as a patent pool is surely decreased by the threat of antitrust enforcement-likewise agreements that expand patent scope or protect invalid patents. Yet, deterrence alone is probably inadequate because of a substantial danger of undetected collusion. 114 Deterrence is also limited because enforcement agencies fear that overzealous antitrust enforcement will discourage socially desirable patent pools and cross-licenses. The Department of Justice (DOJ) announced guidelines that help fine tune public antitrust enforcement.
115 But, we should not be too optimistic that antitrust law can finely distinguish pro-competitive from anticompetitive pooling and cross-licensing.
116
My discussion so far suggests that pooling or cross-licensing inevitably follows a patent flood-but that is not true. The multiparty bargaining problem facing patent owners is a major impediment. History shows that agreements are easier to reach in industries with homogeneous members who deal with each other repeatedly. 117 History also shows longstanding bargaining impasses 114. See Priest, supra note 103, at 329 (noting that with cross-licensing it is more difficult to distinguish cartelization from legitimate exploitation); Kaplow, supra note 112, at 1865-67. Antitrust scrutiny failed to detect collusion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931) (upholding a pool comprised of competing patents when its examination failed to uncover any restraint of trade or monopolization).
115. Two important rules of thumb are that pooled patents should be complements not substitutes. See Priest, supra note 103, at 357-58 (distinguishing cross-licensing of substitute and complementary patents). Pool members must reasonably fear infringing each others' patents. See Merges, supra note 98, at 1293 n.225 ("Where industry members are seen to pervasively infringe each other's patents, and where valuation and exchange mechanisms appear to serve no ulterior purpose beyond setting compensation for these infringements, a real working pool is in effect."). The DOJ view pooling as procompetitive when it integrates complementary inventions, and reduces transaction and litigation costs. See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 108. Sections 101 and 103 of the Patent Act offer opportunities to reduce the frequency of patent floods either by limiting the extent to which business methods are patentable subject matter or by making it difficult to show business method inventions are nonobvious.
120 At this early stage we cannot be sure how broadly the Federal Circuit will read State Street. Experience with software patentability suggests the court will read it quite broadly.
121 It is also too early to know how rigorously the § 103 non-obviousness requirement will be applied to business methods.
Two questions left open after State Street are critical to determining the extent of business method patentability. There is therefore no guarantee that pooling, cross licensing, or consolidation will always emerge to break an industry impasse. And without these solutions there is nothing to mitigate the effect of broad basic patents in cumulative technology industries. Earlier we saw that theory offered a number of reasons to be concerned about these patents. The historical evidence available is consistent with this theory. In most instances this evidence can be read as supportive of our concerns about the effects of broad patents on cumulative technology industries.
Id.
119. See Merges, supra note 98, at 1355. But favorable business review letters from the DOJ encouraged three recent patent pools. The DOJ issued business review letters sanctioning three recent patent pools to share royalties from patents covering the Moving Picture Expert Group (MPEG) 2 compression technology standard, and patents on certain digital video disc vague on these matters. 122 A narrow reading treats these two cases as software cases holding that there is no reason to discriminate against software merely because it has a business purpose. 123 Under this narrow reading, business method claims that lack a software implementation could be rejected for being outside the bounds of patentable processes. Yet, even under this narrow reading, State Street will have a significant economic impact because software based claims will often preempt any practical use of a business method.
124
A broad reading of these cases opens the door to patents on the full spectrum of management techniques. A software limitation on patentable subject matter might not be required because Judge Rich nowhere limited his ruling to software and he cited old business method cases predating computer technology. 125 Additionally, the language in State Street emphasizes there is no need for a physical transformation to make a process patentable. Since he referred to cases from as long ago as 1908 which far pre-date the computer, it is arguably the case that Rich was suggesting that even business methods which are implemented without the use of a computer should be eligible for patent protection (although it appears that, under current practice, the PTO would reject such applications).
Id.
126. See Merges, supra note 26, at 577 n.24.
Indeed, there is a fair argument that a business concept is patentable whether or not it is implemented on a computer: [In State Street Bank] the Federal Circuit indicated that whether an invention is directed to patentable subject matter under § 101 does not depend on whether a "physical" transformation takes place or whether the claim is directed to a process or a machine. From this, it might then follow that a claimed process for, e.g., performing the function similar to Signature's invention, is patentable even absent its use with a computer. As long as the variables represent some set processes are freed from a connection with physical apparatus, then the full range of business methods discussed in Part II may be patentable subject matter. 127 Of course, it is possible that the words "useful, tangible, and concrete" will be invoked to limit the range of business methods that are patentable.
128
Policy arguments are not much of a guide in predicting how broadly the Federal Circuit will interpret State Street. The policy arguments for and against expanding patentable subject matter to include business methods are not well developed. Proponents favor the broadest reach of patentable subject matter consistent with the statute and the Constitution.
129 They believe that the incentive effect created by patent property rights is desirable in any field of innovation. Opponents claim that 200 years of experience shows that monetary values, it arguably should not matter who or what does the "transforming." After all, regardless of the transforming mechanism (e.g., machine or human), the invention can be said to have "practical utility," and produce a "useful, concrete and tangible result.
Id.
127. See Thomas, supra note 72, at 6 ("Disconnected from particular physical apparatus, such patents will set forth not so much technical artifacts, but a broad category of proprietary modes of analysis, techniques and protocols from disciplines ranging from the social sciences to the law.").
128. See Keeley-Domokos, supra note 123, at 153.
The type of business methods that are likely to benefit from the State Street decision, however, are probably more material than just general functional operating schemes. The court in State Street repeatedly reiterated the utility of the invention disclosed in Signature's patent, while concurrently emphasizing the concreteness and materiality of the result that the invention achieved. The State Street decision seems to indicate that to be patentable, business methods must achieve concrete and material results in addition to being useful. If this interpretation is correct, it would probably be difficult for a company to prove that a general operating business plan developed by that company deserves patent protection. To satisfy the requirements of concreteness and materiality, such a company would probably have to provide conclusive evidence that the new business method decreases operating costs, increases productivity, or achieves some other tangible economic benefit. Such an analysis would probably involve complex forecasting techniques and rely on economic assumptions and projections. The speculative nature of such endeavors probably reduces the likelihood that companies will attempt to patent general business operating methods. 131 I agree with this reason for opposing patents on business methods, but it has not impressed the Federal Circuit so far.
Id
132
The Court should revive the business method exception, or at least employ a narrow reading that limits business method patents to methods with a software implementation. Reviving the business method exception would return us to a world in which customer service methods get relatively little intellectual property protection.
133
Some administrative methods would still be eligible for patent protection and many would benefit from trade secret protection. I greatly prefer trade secret protection because most of the flood problems I described in Part IV apply to patents but not trade secrets.
134 A broad reading of State Street is most harmful because it 130 . See Raskind, supra note 12, at 92-93 (discussing an adequate incentive for innovation in business methods without patent protection); Thomas, supra note 72, at 58 (favoring a restriction of method patents to industrial applications).
131. See Dreyfuss, supra note 89, at 275 (arguing the social cost of business method patents exceed the social benefits).
132. Let me take a moment to comment a little further on policy analysis of the bounds of patentable subject matter. The core trade-off in judging the social value of a patent compares the increased incentive to invent arising from the prospect of a patent to the decreased diffusion of the invention because of the exclusionary power of a patent. Proponents argue that this tradeoff should be implemented on a case-by-case basis via the nonobviousness standard of § 103. They could argue that the subject matter boundary seems like a poor alternative policy instrument because the trade-off is made for a class of inventions rather than a specific invention. I would respond by claiming that cost savings justify exclusion of business methods § 101 because a proper nonobviousness analysis (based on the economic trade-off) would deny patents to most business method inventions. 134. Trade secrets cannot be used to exclude competitors or slow cumulative innovation or diffusion because independent invention is allowed under trade secret law. Trade secrets do generate significant litigation and they lack the disclosure feature of patent law. allows full patentability of customer service methods, but even a narrow reading allows patents protecting financial securities like Signature's invention.
Even if State Street is reversed there will still be some degree of patent protection available to business methods. The reason is that some methods useful in business have applications in technical fields as well. Some older business methods applications that were claimed as software perished on subject matter grounds because they were viewed as too abstract; but others escaped rejection on subject matter grounds. A prominent example is the linear programming algorithm invented by Karmarkar and patented by AT&T. This sort of algorithm has engineering applications, but its most profitable application for AT&T has been to management problems. 135 The engineering applications of the Karmarkar algorithm leave no doubt about patentability.
Expanded patent protection does not matter if firms choose trade secret protection in preference to patents. 136 This option is most likely for administrative method inventions. 137 Many of these methods are easy to keep secret and have a limited number of potential customers. 138 These same characteristics make patents hard to enforce. 139 Trade secret protection is also preferable for firms who are 138. Often these methods are tailored specifically to a particular corporation; they are tailored to reflect that corporation's culture. Because the inventor is a manager in the corporation that is apt to be the only customer for the method, there is little reason to obtain a patent.
139. Infringement is especially difficult to detect when the infringing manager practices the method in her head. In the early days of software patents, commentators recognized a mental steps doctrine that would block software claims that are so abstract that they can be infringed by concerned about imitation by competitors outside of the United States since business methods are not patentable elsewhere. 140 The disclosure from the patent application would disseminate the invention to foreign users. Furthermore, fear of nonobviousness invalidation might encourage trade secret protection. Secret prior art and a vast body of poorly catalogued prior art might make inventors worry about validity attacks based on prior art unavailable to the examiner. One more factor favors trade secrecy. The first inventor defense reduces the risk to trade secret owners that a later inventor will sue them as infringers. 141 Expanding the scope of this defense to include any prior user is a desirable, if indirect, way to minimize the number of business method patents.
142
It is possible but unlikely that future floods of business method patents will be avoided by rigorous screening via the nonobviousness standard.
143 Section 103 has not presented much of a barrier in the thought.
140. See President of the European Patent Office, Examination of "business method" applications, at www.uspto.gov/web/tws/appendix6.pdf (May 19, 2000) .
Methods of doing business are, according to Article 52(2) EPC, not to be considered to be inventions. Although not explicitly stated, this exclusion is also considered to apply to a wide range of subject-matters which, while not literally methods of doing business, share the same quality of being concerned more with interpersonal, societal and financial relationships, than with the stuff of engineering-thus for example, valuation of assets, advertising, teaching, choosing among candidates for a job, etc. The term "business methods" has become a generally used shorthand for all of these areas.
Id.
141. The "First Inventor Defense Act of 1999" Subtitle C provides a defense against charges of patent infringement for a party who had, in good faith, actually reduced the subject matter to practice at least one year before the effective filing date of the patent, and commercially used the subject matter before the effective filing date. The defense is limited to methods of "doing or conducting business." Section 273 creates a new "First Inventor Defense." The defense is available against business method claims if the defendant acted in good faith and reduced to practice the claimed invention more than one year before the effective filing date of such patent, and commercially used the invention before the filing date.
142. See Dreyfuss, supra note 89, at 272 (noting the limited scope of first inventor defense); see also AIPLA White Paper, Patenting Business Methods, at www.aipla.org/html/ whitepaper2.html (Nov. 27, 2000) (opposing special treatment of business method patents).
143. See Grusd, supra note 136, at 9 ("Unlike most commentators, the author will argue that the State Street holding does not necessarily lower the standard for obtaining patents on business methods. The State Street holding merely shifts the patent inquiry away from the 35 U.S.C. § 101 subject matter analysis to the novelty, utility, nonobviousness, and specification inquiries.").
PTO to persistent e-commerce patent applicants. Patent examiners find it difficult to reject applications on obvious inventions because they lack prior art they need to document their basis for rejection. 144 Weak patents still might be invalidated in court but much of the harm associated with patent floods is done when the PTO issues the patents. 145 However, the problem lies not just with application of the obviousness test in the PTO, the standard itself is too lenient (at least as applied to business method inventions). 146 The increasing reliance on secondary considerations makes the obviousness hurdle too low. 147 Especially troubling is the use of commercial success as an indicator of nonobviousness because the nexus between commercial success and a business method invention should be quite easy to establish. Another problematic aspect of obviousness doctrine is the requirement that the examiner must show that the prior art contains a suggestion to modify old methods. I suspect that many future business method inventions will consist of melding old business methods with new technologies, or updating old methods for new To establish a prima facie case of obviousness, three basic criteria must be met. First, there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation of success. Finally, the prior art reference (or references when combined) must teach or suggest all the claim limitations.
Id.; see also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553-54 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (the dissent criticizes the majority's reasoning and suggests a danger that music CDs are now patentable as a manufacture, because they are novel, and the PTO would not be able to show obviousness). 
markets.
148 John Kasdan illustrates this point by citing the Priceline.com patent on an Internet version of the reverse auction method that has been around for a long time. 149 VII. CONCLUSION I argue that the social cost of business method patents may be higher than other types of patents because of the problem of patent floods. Business method inventions are likely to cluster around the time that a new market opens. The cluster of inventions gives rise to a flood of patents. Patent floods create social costs that exceed the simple aggregate of the social costs associated with each patent in the flood. Those costs are attributable to increased licensing and litigation costs, an increased danger of anticompetitive exclusionary use of patents, and a stifling of refinement and application of the patented inventions.
I am particularly troubled by patents on business methods that I call customer service methods. Customer service methods relate to marketing, product features, and product varieties. In comparison to administrative methods, customer service methods are likely to cluster around the time a new market opens, and thereby create flood problems. I fear that customer service methods are especially likely to create a patent thicket that slows cumulative innovation and diffusion, and institutions like patent pools may not emerge to solve these problems because of the uncertain valuation of these inventions and the heterogeneity of the inventions and patent owners. Trade secret law rather than patent law will often protect administrative methods, so making them patentable subject matter might not have significant effects.
